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Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker:
Pondering Modern Sentencing Process
Douglas A. Berman
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington and its federal
follow-up United States v. Booker are formally about the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. But these decisions implicate and reflect,
both expressly and implicitly, a much broader array of constitutional provisions
and principles, in particular, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the notice provision of the Sixth Amendment. And the future
structure and operation of modern sentencing systems may greatly depend on how
courts and others approach the due process provisions and principles which lurk in
the unexplored shadows of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and Booker.
In this foreword, I explain why an important enduring question which emerges
from the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing jurisprudence concerns whether, when
and how procedural issues other than the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right will
be addressed after Blakely and Booker. In Part I, I provide a brief account of
modern sentencing reform and its neglect of an array of procedural issues. Part II
focuses upon the Supreme Court’s past and present jurisprudential struggles with
procedural rights at sentencing. Part III sketches considerations for courts and
other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what process is due in
modern sentencing systems.
Part III concludes by suggesting that the pitched battle over the rights and results
in Blakely and Booker reflect competing visions of what procedural concepts and
norms will take center-stage as the Supreme Court considers the applicable con-
stitutional rules for modern sentencing decision-making. Justice Stevens leads a
faction of the Court concerned about safeguarding procedural rights for defen-
dants at sentencing, while Justice Breyer leads a faction of the Court concerned
about ensuring that applicable procedures at sentencing serve the goal of sen-
tencing uniformity. But, with Justice Ginsburg having allied herself with both of
these competing factions in Booker, the schizophrenic Booker ruling further ob-
scures which principles should guide lower courts in considering the broad range
of procedural issues beyond jury trial rights that follow in the wake of Blakely and
Booker.
0091-4169/05/9503-0653
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 95, No. 3
Copyright © 2005 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
653
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: BEYOND BLAKELY AND 
BOOKER: PONDERING MODERN 
SENTENCING PROCESS
DOUGLAS A. BERMAN*
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Blakely v. Washington1 and 
its federal follow-up United States v. Booker2 are formally about the 
meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial.  But these 
decisions implicate and reflect, both expressly and implicitly, a much 
broader array of constitutional provisions and principles, in particular, the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice 
provision of the Sixth Amendment.  And the future structure and operation 
of modern sentencing systems may greatly depend on how courts and others 
approach the due process provisions and principles which lurk in the 
unexplored shadows of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and 
Booker.
In this foreword, I explain why an important enduring question which 
emerges from the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing jurisprudence 
concerns whether, when and how procedural issues other than the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial right will be addressed after Blakely and Booker.  In 
Part I, I provide a brief account of modern sentencing reform and its neglect 
of an array of procedural issues.  Part II focuses upon the Supreme Court’s 
past and present jurisprudential struggles with procedural rights at 
sentencing.  Part III concludes by briefly sketching some considerations for 
courts and other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what 
process is due in modern sentencing systems.
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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I. THE SENTENCING REVOLUTION: MODERN SENTENCING REFORMS AND 
THE NEGLECT OF SENTENCING PROCEDURES
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM MOVEMENT
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and throughout the first three-
quarters of the twentieth century, a highly discretionary, rehabilitative 
“medical” model was the dominant approach to sentencing.3  Trial judges in 
both federal and state systems had nearly unfettered discretion to impose on 
defendants any sentence from within the broad statutory ranges provided 
for criminal offenses.4  Such broad judicial discretion in the ascription of 
sentencing terms—complemented by parole officials exercising similar 
discretion concerning prison release dates—was viewed as necessary to 
ensure that sentences could be tailored to the rehabilitative prospects and 
progress of each offender.5  The rehabilitative ideal was often conceived 
and discussed in medical terms—with offenders described as “sick” and 
punishments aspiring to “cure the patient”6—and sentencing judges and 
parole officials were thought to have unique insights and expertise in 
deciding what sorts and lengths of punishments were necessary to best 
serve each criminal offender’s rehabilitative potential.7  Procedurally, 
3 See, e.g., SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 5-6 (1985); J. L. MILLER ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM 1-6 
(1981).  See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 3-7 
(1981) (discussing the “dominance” and “almost unchallenged sway of the rehabilitative 
ideal” through the late 1960s).
4 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps 
Backward, 78 JUDICATURE 169, 169-70 (1995) (“Subject only to statutory maximums and the 
occasional minimums, judges had the authority to sentence convicted defendants either to 
probation (and under what conditions) or to prison (and for what maximum term).”); see also
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (discussing the “wide discretion” given 
to federal judges in ascribing sentences during this time).
5 See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission’s Functions, in THE 
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) 
(noting that “wide discretion was ostensibly justified for rehabilitative ends: to enable judges 
and parole officials familiar with the case to choose a disposition tailored to the offender’s 
need for treatment”).  See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-22 (1998) (reviewing the early history 
of federal sentencing and the link between the rehabilitative ideal and discretionary 
sentencing practices).
6 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 163 (1967) (describing offenders as “patients”); see 
also Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 (1991) 
(discussing the medical model and its “powerful sway within the criminal justice system”).
7 See Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 83, 83 (2002) 
(describing vision of “judge as the sentencing expert” in a rehabilitative sentencing system); 
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sentencing was really a form of administrative decision-making in which 
sentencing judges and parole officials, aided by complete information about 
offenders and unfettered discretionary authority, were expected to craft 
individualized sentences “almost like a doctor or social worker exercising 
clinical judgment.”8
But through the 1960s and 1970s, criminal justice researchers and 
scholars were growing concerned about the unpredictable and disparate 
sentences highly discretionary sentencing systems could produce.  Evidence 
suggested that broad judicial sentencing discretion was resulting in 
substan tial and undue differences in the lengths and types of sentences 
meted out to similar defendants,9 and some studies found that personal 
factors such as an offender’s race, gender and socioeconomic status were 
impacting sentencing outcomes and accounted for certain disparities.10
Troubled by the disparity and discrimination resulting from highly 
discretionary sentencing practices—and fueled by concerns over increasing 
crime rates and powerful criticisms of the entire rehabilitative model of 
punishment and corrections11—many criminal justice experts proposed 
reforms in order to bring greater consistency and certainty to the sentencing 
enterprise.12
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 19-21 (describing view of parole officials as experts in 
assessing an offender’s rehabilitation).
8 United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004).
9 See, e.g., Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 272-74 
(1977) (reviewing studies and asserting that “the data on unjust sentencing disparity have 
indeed become quite overwhelming”); Ilene Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The 
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) 
(detailing studies showing widespread, unwarranted sentencing disparities).
10 See Nagel, supra note 9, at 895-97 & nn.73-84 (discussing empirical studies 
documenting sentencing impact of race, gender, socioeconomic class and other status 
characteristics); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold 
Approach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 359-62
(1991) (reviewing studies revealing the impact of racial discrimination at sentencing).
11 See ALLEN, supra note 3, at 7-20 (discussing “wide and precipitious decline of penal 
rehabilitationism” as a foundational theory for the criminal justice system).  See generally 
AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971); ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, 
PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS (1976); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
12 See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSIONERS’ MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT (1979) [hereinafter MODEL 
SENTENCING ACT]; PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING 
SYSTEM (1977); VON HIRSCH, supra note 11; DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING 
PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1975); see also NORVAL MORRIS, THE 
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) (stressing need to reform sentencing practices as a 
prerequisite to making imprisonment a rational and humane means of punishment).  See 
generally ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM
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While concerns about sentencing disparities and discrimination were a 
catalyst for modern sentencing reforms, the fundamental problem with 
traditional discretionary sentencing systems was the absence of any defined 
sentencing law.  This was Judge Marvin Frankel’s central insight and 
criticism in commentaries that helped fuel the modern sentencing reform 
movement over thirty years ago.13  Sentencing disparity, in Frankel’s 
words, was a symptom of the greater disease of “lawlessness in 
sentencing.”  Frankel recognized that, at a time of declining faith in the 
rehabilitative model, “legislatures [had] not done the most rudimentary job 
of enacting meaningful sentencing ‘laws’,”14 and thus sentencing judges 
(and parole officials) exercised broad discretion and wielded enormous 
sentencing power “effectively subject to no law at all.”15
Frankel was concerned about not only the absence of substantive 
sentencing law, but also the questionable procedures through which 
sentencing decisions were rendered.  In a chapter of his book Criminal 
Sentences: Law Without Order entitled “The Dubious Process,” Frankel 
noted the absence of significant procedural safeguards in discretionary 
sentencing decision-making,16 and he suggested that the lack of procedural 
regularity contributed to “a wild array of sentencing judgments without any 
semblance of consistency.”17  Frankel expressed particular concern about 
how information considered at sentencing was assembled and examined.  
He noted that “presentence investigation represents a sudden and total 
departure from [a court’s usual] fact-gathering procedures,” because it 
provides information to judges that is not “exposed to adversary scrutiny, to 
rechecking at sources, to cross-examination.”18  Frankel highlighted that, 
because presentence investigations relied upon ex parte reports from 
prosecutors and findings were typically not disclosed to defendants, courts 
at sentencing were often making “grave decisions of law upon untested 
hearsay and rumor.”19  Frankel lamented that, because the contents of 
126-42 (1983) (describing forces behind early reforms); MILLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 6-13 
(noting that sentencing reform was “stimulated by perceptions of increasing crime, 
unwarranted differences in sentences, and ineffective rehabilitation programs”).
13 See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972) 
[hereinafter Frankel, Lawlessness]; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972) [hereinafter FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES].
14 FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 7.
15 Id. at 3-11; see also Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative 
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992) (calling prior sentencing “thoroughly 
lawless”).
16 See FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 26-38.
17 Id. at 7-8.
18 Id. at 27-32.
19 Id. at 28-32.
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presentence reports originated “from the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s 
files” and were “passed on with little or no independent scrutiny,” 
sentencing decision-making involved a “process of reaching [a sentencing 
judgment that was] not reflective or orderly.”20
Since “lawlessness” was the fundamental problem in discretionary 
sentencing systems, Frankel urged the development of a “code of penal
law” which would “prescribe guidelines for the application and assessment” 
of “the numerous factors affecting the length or severity of sentences.”21
Moreover, Frankel suggested creating a new institution in the form of a 
special agency—a “Commission on Sentencing”—to help address 
lawlessness in sentencing.22 Embracing the spirit and substance of 
Frankel’s ideas, many experts and scholars soon came to propose or 
endorse some form of sentencing guidelines to govern sentencing 
determinations,23 and urged the creation of specialized sentencing 
commissions to develop the sentencing law called for by the “guidelines 
model.”24
These calls for reform were soon heeded.  Through the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, a few states adopted a form of sentencing guidelines when 
legislatures passed determinate sentencing statutes which abolished parole 
and created presumptive sentencing ranges for various classes of offenses.25
Minnesota became the first state to turn Frankel’s ideas into a full-fledged 
reality in 1978, when the Minnesota legislature established the Minnesota 
20 Id. at 34, 38.
21 Id. at 103-18; see also Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About 
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 656 (1993) (statement 
by Marvin Frankel) (explaining that the “overriding objective” of sentencing guideline 
reforms “was to subject sentencing to law”).
22 FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 13, at 118-24; see also Frankel, 
Lawlessness, supra note 13, at 50-54.
23 See sources cited supra note 12; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3 
(1988) (explaining that “[a]t the federal level before 1985, scholars and practitioners in the 
criminal justice community almost unanimously favored the concept of guidelines”); Charles 
J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1988) (noting that the “general consensus . . . among judges, 
lawyers, criminal justice experts, and scholars, [was] that sentencing guidelines were 
needed”).
24 See Michael H. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 315, 324 (1979); MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 12, at § 3-110 & cmt.;
O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 12, at 73-74.
25 See MICHAEL H. TONRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS 77-85 
(1987); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 14-17 (1996) (discussing move to determinate sentencing in 
various jurisdictions) [hereinafter STRUCTURED SENTENCING].
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Sentencing Guidelines Commission to develop comprehensive sentencing 
guidelines.26  Washington and Pennsylvania followed suit by creating their 
own distinctive forms of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines 
in 1981 and 1982, respectively.27  During the early 1980s, various systems 
of sentencing guidelines also emerged in Utah, Maryland, Florida and 
Michigan, although permanent sentencing commissions were not 
established in these states until years later.28  The federal government soon 
thereafter joined this sentencing reform movement through the passage of 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to develop guidelines for federal sentencing.29  Throughout the 
next two decades, many more states adopted some form of structured 
sentencing either though mandatory sentencing statutes or comprehensive 
guideline schemes.30
Though there is considerable variation in the form and impact of 
structured sentencing reforms, the overall transformation of the sentencing 
enterprise throughout the United States over the past three decades has been 
remarkable.31  The highly-discretionary indeterminate sentencing systems 
26 See 1978 Minn. Laws 723 (enabling statute).  The initial version of the Minnesota 
sentencing guidelines was contained in MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (1980).  See generally DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Daniel J. 
Freed ed., 1988) (discussing the operations of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission, the state’s enactment, and early experiences with sentencing guidelines).
27 See 204 PA. CODE § 303 (1982) (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West 
1982)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.040 (West 1988).  See generally A Summary of the 
Minnesota, Washington, and Pennsylvania Guidelines, in THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND 
ITS GUIDELINES app. at 177-88 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing major 
components of guidelines developed in Minnesota, Washington and Pennsylvania).
28 See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the 
Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 69, 70 (2000) 
(providing table summarizing development of sentencing guidelines systems).
29 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 58, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017-26 
(1984).
30 See STRUCTURED SENTENCING, supra note 25, at 19-29 & tbls. 3-3 to 3-5 (detailing 
sentencing structures throughout United States as of February 1994); Frase, supra note 28, at 
69-72 (detailing and discussing the nearly two dozen jurisdictions that now have, or are 
actively considering, a sentencing system incorporating sentencing guidelines devised by a 
sentencing commission); DALE PARENT ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MANDATORY 
SENTENCING 1 (1997) (noting that “[b]y 1994, all 50 States had enacted one or more 
mandatory sentencing laws, and Congress had enacted numerous mandatory sentencing laws 
for Federal offenders”).
31 See Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information 
Systems, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 121 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004) (“Sentencing has 
undergone more reform over the past several decades than any other area of criminal justice, 
and perhaps as much reform as any area of the law.”); see also Tonry, supra note 4, at 169 
(“If a time machine were to transport a group of state and federal judges from 1970 to a 
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that had been dominant for nearly a century have been replaced by an array 
of sentencing structures that govern and control sentencing decision-
making.  Put simply, in response to Judge Frankel’s call for reforms, 
jurisdictions brought law—often lots and lots of law—to sentencing.
B. A NEGLECT OF SENTENCING PROCEDURES
The arrival of modern sentencing laws did not come with a new 
modern set of sentencing procedures.  While legislatures and sentencing 
commissions were revolutionizing the substance of sentencing in an effort 
to ensure more consistent and rational sentencing outcomes, serious 
consideration of the procedures of sentencing was essentially overlooked.  
Legisla tures and sentencing commissions have committed much time and 
energy to enacting laws and developing guidelines to govern substantive 
sentencing decisions, but they have given scant attention to regulating the 
processes through which judges obtain and assess the information that 
serves as the basis for reaching these decisions.  Despite creating a 
significant body of substantive sentencing law, legislatures and 
commissions in most jurisdictions have left largely unaddressed 
fundamental issues such as notice to parties, burdens of proof, appropriate 
fact-finders, evidentiary rules, and hearing processes—even though these 
procedural matters play a central role in the actual application of general 
sentencing rules to specific cases.32
Though the particulars of this story could be recounted in various 
jurisdictions, the experience and struggles of the federal sentencing system 
are the most conspicuous and well-documented.  The Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984,33 though an elaborate piece of legislation, makes only brief 
mention of sentencing procedures.34  The initial Federal Sentencing 
Guide lines promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission—which 
national conference on sentencing in 1995, most would be astonished by a quarter century’s 
changes.”).
32 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Completing the Sentencing Revolution: Reconsidering 
Sentencing Procedures in the Guidelines Era, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 187, 187 (2000) 
(noting that sentencing reformers largely forgot procedural issues in the development of new 
sentencing systems); see also Douglas A. Berman, Appreciating Apprendi: Developing 
Sentencing Procedures in the Shadow of the Constitution, 67 CRIM. L. BULL. 627, 636-40 
(2001) (discussing sentencing reformers’ emphasis on substance over procedure).
33 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
34 See THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE § 
6A1.3 (1998) (noting that “[i]n the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress did not provide for 
specific procedures at sentencing”); see also Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the 
Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of 
Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 314 (1992) (stating that “[t]he Sentencing Reform Act 
does not mention procedure”).
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comprised more than two hundred pages and contained over one hundred 
multi-section guidelines—were remarkably detailed and sought to 
comprehensively prescribe the weight to be given at sentencing to a host of 
offense and offender factors.35  Yet, even though the Sentencing 
Commission itself recognized that “[r]eliable fact-finding is essential to 
procedural due process and to the accuracy and uniformity of sentencing,”36
less than three pages of the initial Guidelines expressly addressed the 
sentencing process.37
Through a few terse policy statements in these pages, the Sentencing 
Commission did call for the preparation and timely disclosure of pre-
sentence reports,38 and urged judges to give parties “an adequate 
opportunity” to dispute any factor important to the sentencing determination 
and rely only on information with “sufficient indicia of reliability to support 
its probable accuracy.”39  But, in sharp contrast to the other portions of the 
Guidelines, which intricately delineated how various substantive matters 
should be incorporated into the Guidelines calculus, the Commission did 
not go beyond these vague exhortations to provide any detailed guidance to 
judges on issues like notice to parties, appropriate burdens of proof and 
fact-finders, or applicable evidentiary rules and hearing procedures.  As 
Professor Kate Stith and Judge Jose Cabranes aptly recognized, “[b]eyond 
making the important but obvious point that fact-finding at sentencing 
should be reliable, the Commission’s Policy Statements prescribe few 
procedural safeguards to ensure that this objective is achieved.”40  And lest 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission be unduly singled out, it should be noted 
that the vague exhortations concerning sentencing procedures in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines generally surpass the amount of attention given to 
procedural matters in many state sentencing reforms.41
35 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY 
STATEMENTS (1987) [hereinafter 1987 U.S.S.G.].
36 Id. Ch. 6, Pt. A, at 6.1 (Introductory Commentary).
37 See id. Ch. 6, Pt. A, at 6.A.1-6.A.3.
38 See id. §§ 6A1.1, 6A1.2.
39 Id. § 6A1.3.
40 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 5, at 154; accord Herman, supra note 34, at 315 
(noting that “the Commission contented itself with simply commenting that more formal 
proceedings should be required at sentencing under the guidelines and leaving it to the courts 
to implement this suggestion”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE 
COMM., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS, 177 F.R.D. 513, 514 
(1998) (noting that “neither Congress (in the SRA) nor the Commission (in the Guidelines) 
addressed in any detail critical evidentiary issues such as burdens of proof, admissibility of 
evidence, confrontation rights and hearing procedures”).
41 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 599 N.E.2d 913, 921 (Ill. 1992) (noting absence of 
language in Illinois sentencing statute specifying burden of proof); Commonwealth v. Hartz, 
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Real limitations of time and perceived limitations of authority may in 
part explain the failure of federal and state sentencing reformers to give 
serious attention to matters of procedure.  Given the challenge of 
developing legal rules for the previously law-free arena of sentencing,42 and 
with disparities in substantive sentencing outcomes a principal concern, 
legislatures and sentencing commissions understandably focused their 
attention first and foremost on reforming (or, in most cases, creating) 
substantive sentencing laws.  Moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
suggested in various ways that it believed other institutions—in particular, 
the judiciary—were in the best position and possessed ultimate authority to 
prescribe procedural rules for sentencing.43  Nevertheless, whatever reasons 
or excuses might be given for the failure to attend to sentencing procedures, 
the fact remained that the applicable procedures used at sentencing—a key 
concern expressed by Judge Frankel in his impassioned call for sentencing 
reforms—were not seriously addressed or carefully considered in most 
modern sentencing laws and guidelines.
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PROCEDURAL SENTENCING JURISPRUDENCE
A. THE OLD WORLD ORDER
It is possible that modern sentencing reforms neglected procedural 
considerations because the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional sentencing 
jurisprudence readily permitted such neglect.  Through a series of cases 
extending over fifty years and through the start of the sentencing reform 
era, the Supreme Court expressed little or no interest in interpreting various 
constitutional provisions to regulate the procedures which governed (non-
532 A.2d 1139, 1157-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting failure of Pennsylvania guidelines to 
provide specified burden of proof for sentencing enhancement).
42 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 64-69 (1996) (detailing the host of 
significant substantive issues and policy choices that face sentencing commissions when 
drafting guidelines); see also Breyer, supra note 23, at 2-31 (stressing the unique challenges 
facing the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the range of substantive compromises reached 
in developing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
43 See 1987 U.S.S.G., supra note 35, at § 6A1.3 comt. (indicating that it is up to a 
sentencing court to “determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute, 
its relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case law”); see also STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 154 (noting that “[i]t is arguable that the Commission is not 
authorized by statute to address issues of procedural fairness under the Guidelines in any 
definitive way”); Herman, supra note 34, at 314-15 (indicating that there “is some doubt as 
to whether the Commission had authority to develop procedures to accompany the 
guidelines” and suggesting that the Commission did not create procedural rules “because of 
doubts about its own powers or optimism about the ability of the courts to develop 
procedures appropriate to the new mode of sentencing”).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
662 DOUGLAS A. BERMAN [Vol. 95
capital) sentencing.
The modern line of precedents marking the Supreme Court’s hands-off 
jurisprudence concerning sentencing procedures starts in 1949 with the 
critical decision in Williams v. New York.44  The trial judge in Williams 
sentenced to death a defendant convicted of first-degree murder, despite a 
jury recommendation of life imprisonment.  The judge relied on 
information of illegal and unsavory activities by the defendant which was 
not presented at trial but appeared in a pre-sentence report.45  In rejecting a 
claim that Williams had a right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him, the Supreme Court stressed that “[r]eformation and 
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence” and spoke approvingly of the “prevalent modern philosophy 
of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the 
crime.”46  Thus, continued the Court, the Due Process Clause should not be 
read to require courts to “abandon their age-old practice of seeking 
information from out-of-court sources,” because “[t]o deprive sentencing 
judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological 
procedural policies” which rely upon judges having “the fullest information 
possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”47  In short, 
according to the Williams Court, the value of “modern concepts 
individualizing punishments” meant that sentencing judges should “not be 
denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of 
rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the 
trial.”48
In other words, for the Williams Court the rehabilitative ideal not only 
justified entrusting judges with enormous sentencing discretion, it also 
called for sentencing judges (and presumably also parole officials) to be 
freed from any procedural rules which might work to limit the sound 
exercise of their discretion.  Significantly, the Williams Court suggested the 
rehabilitative ideal and its distinctive procedures had benefits for offenders 
as well as for society.  The Court stressed that “modern changes” justified 
by the rehabilitative model of sentencing “have not resulted in making the 
lot of offenders harder.”49  Rather, explained the Court, “a strong 
44 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
45 See id. at 242-44.  For a full discussion of the various “facts” relied upon by the 
sentencing judge in Williams, see Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-
Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523, 528-30 (1993).
46 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247-48.
47 Id. at 247, 250-51.
48 Id. at 247.
49 Id. at 249.
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motivating force for the changes has been the belief that by careful study of 
the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less 
severely punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful 
citizenship.”50  And, claimed the Williams Court, “[t]his belief to a large 
extent has been justified.”51
Notably, Williams was decided before the Supreme Court began 
“revolutionizing” criminal procedure by expansively interpreting the 
Constitution to provide criminal defendants with an array of procedural 
rights.52  Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as numerous pre-
trial and trial rights were being established for defendants, the Supreme 
Court continued to cite Williams favorably and continued to suggest that 
sentencing was to be treated differently—and could be far less procedurally 
regulated—than a traditional criminal trial.53  Though the Supreme Court 
did ensure that defendants had a right to an attorney at sentencing hearings 
and suggested defendants also had a right to discovery of evidence that 
could impact a sentence,54 the Court did not formally extend other Bill of 
Rights protections to the sentencing process.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 The application and extension of considerable procedural rights to criminal defendants 
has been called the “criminal procedure revolution” and is often associated with the work of 
the Warren Court in the 1960s.  See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL LAW 
REVOLUTION 1960-68 (1968); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A 
Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995).  However, as commentators have 
discussed, many of the foundational decisions of this era were extended, or even first 
developed, by the Burger Court through the 1970s.  See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the 
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 
72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151 
(1980); Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of 
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436 (1980).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-54 (1978) (discussing Williams
favorably while noting the few limits on the gathering of information for sentencing and a 
judge’s broad discretion to consider a wide range of information in arriving at an appropriate 
sentence); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 21-25 (1973) (reviewing Williams while 
stressing “the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process”); North Carolina 
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (favorably citing Williams while stressing “the freedom 
of a sentencing judge” to consider a defendant’s post-conviction conduct in imposing a 
sentence); see also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 742 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (noting that the Supreme Court has “continued to reaffirm” Williams and its “reasons 
for refusing to subject the sentencing process to any [significant procedural] limitations, 
which might hamstring modern penological reforms”).
54 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (addressing the right to counsel); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (discussing the right to discovery of evidence helpful to the 
defense).
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In 1970, the Supreme Court established, through In re Winship,55 that 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof applicable in criminal cases, and 
stressed that this heightened proof standard operated as a “bedrock 
‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’”56  But, in many 
cases addressing sentencing matters decided not long after Winship, the 
Court did not suggest this standard of proof was to be applicable at 
sentencing.  Rather, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated, in a series of 
cases that touched on various sentencing issues, that at sentencing “a judge 
may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited 
either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from 
which it may come.”57
The U.S. Supreme Court next confronted a direct constitutional claim 
concerning sentencing procedures in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.58  Litigated 
during the early development of structured sentencing reforms, McMillan
involved a constitutional challenge to a Pennsylvania statute passed in 
1982, which provided for the imposition of a five-year mandatory minimum 
sentence if a judge found, by a preponderance of evidence, that an offender 
visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of certain offenses.59
The defendant in McMillan argued that the Constitution required treating 
the fact of firearm possession as an offense element with the traditional trial 
procedures of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury.
Significantly, Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act 
was obviously not enacted in service to the rehabilitative ideal, and its focus 
was exclusively on the offense and not the offender.  As the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania explained in its consideration of McMillan’s claims, the 
Pennsylvania legislature created the mandatory minimum provision “to 
protect the public from armed criminals and to deter violent crime and the 
illegal use of firearms generally, as well as to vindicate its interest in 
punishing those who commit serious crimes with guns.”60  Thus, the 
55 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
56 Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
57 Grayson, 438 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)); 
see also Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (reaffirming as a “fundamental 
sentencing principle” that “a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, 
largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from 
which it may come”) (quoting Grayson and Tucker).
58 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
59 See id. at 81-82 & n.1 (quoting provisions and describing operation of Pennsylvania’s 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act).
60 Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art14
2005] MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS 665
Supreme Court in McMillan was called upon to examine a new type of 
punitive sentencing provision, one in which the philosophical justifications 
for the administrative procedures sanctioned in Williams were no longer 
present.  The Court could not possibly contend or believe, as it suggested 
nearly forty years earlier in Williams, that limiting defendants’ procedural 
rights in this setting was about providing sentencing judges with “the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” in 
order to help defendants “be less severely punished and restored sooner to 
complete freedom and useful citizenship.”61
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected McMillan’s challenges to 
Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act in an opinion that 
largely echoed Williams without any revised justifications.  The McMillan
Court stressed that it is “normally ‘within the power of the State to regulate 
procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of 
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.’”62 The Court  rejected 
the claim that visible possession of a firearm must be treated procedurally 
as an element by stating simply that Pennsylvania’s statute “gives no 
impression of having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding 
to be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”63  The Court 
even rebuffed the suggestion that the Due Process Clause at least required 
that visible firearm possession be proved by clear and convincing evidence; 
it cited Williams for the proposition that “sentencing courts have 
traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden 
of proof at all,” and suggested that it would be inappropriate to be 
“constitutionalizing burdens of proof at sentencing.”64  Coining the term 
“sentencing factor,” the McMillan Court simply asserted, without any 
61 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949).
62 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)).  The 
McMillan Court’s discussion of these matters, and its emphasis on state authority to define 
crimes and attendant procedures, drew heavily on two cases from a decade earlier, Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), in which 
the Supreme Court struggled to define limits for how states could structure affirmative 
defenses as applied to criminal laws.  According to the McMillan Court, the upshot of these 
cases was a rejection of “the claim that whenever a State links the severity of punishment to 
the presence or absence of an identified fact the State must prove that fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  477 U.S. at 84.  See generally Kate Stith, Crime and Punishment Under 
the Constitution, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing holdings and the import of 
Mullaney and Patterson in the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence); Joseph L. 
Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 269-72 
(2001) (also discussing holdings and the import of Mullaney and Patterson in the Supreme 
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence).
63 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
64 Id. at 91-92.
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conceptual discussion of sentencing theories or procedures, that 
Pennsylvania’s decision to dictate the “precise weight” of possession of a 
firearm at sentencing “has not transformed against its will a sentencing 
factor into an ‘element’ of some hypothetical ‘offense.’”65  The McMillan
Court stressed repeatedly the importance of allowing state legislatures to 
devise approaches to sentencing without significant constitutional 
limitations; it asserted that “we should hesitate to conclude that due process 
bars the State from pursuing its chosen course in the area of defining crimes 
and prescribing penalties,” and emphasized the importance of a “tolerance 
for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with a common problem of law 
enforcement.”66
Notably, Justice Stevens delivered a passionate dissent in McMillan
which did engage conceptually with the new realities of Pennsylvania’s 
sentencing law.  Stressing the significance of the fact that Pennsylvania’s 
statute “automatically mandates a punishment” for visible firearm 
possession, Justice Stevens argued that “a state legislature may not dispense 
with the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conduct that it 
targets for severe criminal penalties.”67  Justice Stevens asserted that 
“[o]nce a State defines a criminal offense, the Due Process Clause requires 
it to prove any component of the prohibited transaction that gives rise to 
both a special stigma and a special punishment beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”68  Consequently, according to Justice Stevens, because the 
mandatory minimum statute “describes conduct that the Pennsylvania 
Legislature obviously intended to prohibit, and because it mandates lengthy 
incarceration for the same, . . . the conduct so described is an element of the 
criminal offense to which the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement 
applies.”69
Rendered in 1986 when many legislatures and sentencing commissions 
were starting to explore and develop sentencing reforms, McMillan could 
65 Id. at 89-90.
66 Id. at 84-91 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 566 (1967)).  In addition to the 
obvious impact of federalism concerns, I am inclined to speculate that the decision in 
McMillan may also reflect the Supreme Court’s frustration and fatigue by the mid 1980s 
with its own considerable efforts to constitutionally regulate state capital sentencing 
procedures.  See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305 
(noting that in the early 1980s the Supreme Court had diminished interest in regulating 
capital punishment procedures).
67 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 Id. Writing in a separate dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice 
Blackmun expressly agreed with this statement in Justice Stevens dissent.  See id. at 94 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art14
2005] MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS 667
have had a profound impact, both conceptually and practically, on modern 
sentencing laws if Justice Stevens’s views had carried the day or if the 
Court’s opinion had suggested that the Constitution imposed some 
significant requirements on the sentencing process.  But, with the McMillan
Court stressing the importance of “tolerance for a spectrum of state 
procedures” at sentencing,70 legislatures and commissions could, and 
typically did, neglect procedural matters when reforming the substance of 
sentencing laws.
In the wake of McMillan, as progressively more jurisdictions adopted 
forms of structured sentencing through guideline systems or mandatory 
sentencing statutes, two significant trends emerged.  State courts and lower 
federal courts, citing McMillan and Williams as controlling authority, 
regularly upheld against a range of constitutional challenges various 
structured sentencing systems that imposed punishment without affording 
defendants at sentencing the traditional procedural protections of a criminal 
trial.71  But, at the same time, individual judges and academic 
commentators, citing the unfairness to defendants of being subject to fact-
driven guideline sentencing determinations without significant procedural 
rights, regularly lamented the continued adherence to McMillan and 
Williams as controlling authority.72
The Supreme Court before long was itself swept up in these trends, 
primarily because the structure and operation of the federal sentencing 
guidelines served to heighten the importance of sentencing fact-finding 
while highlighting the absence of procedural safeguards at sentencing.  
70 Id. at 90.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Mergerson, 995 F.2d 1285, 1291-93 (5th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); People v. Vega, 893 P.2d 
107, 116 (Colo. 1995); State v. Rettinghaus, 591 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1999); Farris v. McKune, 
911 P.2d 177 (Kan. 1996); People v. Eason, 458 N.W.2d 17, 21-24 (Mich. 1990); State v. 
Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1993); State v. Krantz, 788 P.2d 298, 303 (Mont. 1990);.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 389, 396 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(Newman, C.J., concurring); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1519, 1527-34 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J. & Martin, J., dissenting); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 
436 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J., dissenting, joined by Arnold, C.J., Lay, & McMillian, JJ.); 
Sara Sun Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitutional 
Significance of the “Elements of the Sentence”, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993); 
Herman, supra note 34; Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the 
Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1057 (1999); Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did 
Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by 
Sentencing Factors Rather than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 
(1998); Reitz, supra note 45; Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the 
Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1994); Note, An Argument for 
Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (1992).
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After upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act against 
structural complaints in Mistretta v. United States,73 the Supreme Court 
began regularly confronting claims that certain aspects of sentencing under 
the federal guidelines were constitutionally problematic because of 
defendants’ limited procedural rights.
Though the Supreme Court initially rebuffed most of these claims 
simply by denying certiorari,74 the sheer number and significance of the 
procedural issues that impacted federal guideline sentencing meant that the 
Court could not avoid weighing in on these matters for long.  And, in a 
series of decisions, the Supreme Court consistently rejected defendants’ 
claims that guideline procedures were constitutionally problematic and 
repudiated defendants’ arguments for expanding the procedural rights 
available during sentencing under the federal guidelines.75
This line of constitutional sentencing jurisprudence reached its high-
water mark, and demonstrated a telling disregard for traditional adversarial 
processes, with the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in United States v. 
Watts.76  In Watts, the Court constitutionally blessed the federal guidelines 
provisions which require judges to enhance defendants’ sentences based on 
conduct underlying charges of which they have been acquitted if the 
gov ernment establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.  
The Watts Court parroted the statement in Williams that it is essential to the 
selection of an appropriate sentence for a judge to have “possession of the 
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 
73 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
74 See generally Kinder v. United States, 504 U.S. 946, 947-50 (1992) (White, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
75 In Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), the Court held that, absent a 
“substantial threshold showing” of discriminatory behavior, a defendant has “no right to
discovery or an evidentiary hearing” to explore a prosecutor’s reasons for refusing to 
recommend a reduced sentence based on the defendant’s cooperation with authorities, id. at 
186-87; in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), the Court upheld a sentence 
enhancement based on a judicial finding of perjury at trial, and it stated that the fact the 
“enhancement stems from a congressional mandate rather than from a court’s discretionary 
judgment cannot be grounds . . . for its invalidation,” id. at 98; in Nichols v. United States, 
511 U.S. 738 (1994), the Court cited both Williams and McMillan and stressed that the 
“traditional understanding of the sentencing process [is] . . . less exacting than the process of 
establishing guilt” to hold that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s previous 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction when sentencing him for a subsequent offense, id. at 
747; in Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995), the Court again placed heavy reliance on 
Williams and McMillan and the fact that sentencing courts have traditionally considered a 
wide range of information without the procedural protections of a criminal trial to hold that 
there was no Double Jeopardy violation when a prior conviction increased punishment 
through sentence calculations under the federal guidelines.  Id. at 399-401.
76 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
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characteristics.”  But the Court did not discuss or even acknowledge that the 
Williams Court made this statement in service to the rehabilitative model of 
sentencing, nor that the federal guideline at issue concerned only offense 
conduct and not broad aspects of the offender’s “life and characteristics.”77
The Watts Court, again without any conceptual discussion, stressed the 
“significance of the different standards of proof that govern at trial and 
sentencing” and noted that “under the pre-Guidelines sentencing regime, it 
was well established that a sentencing judge may take into account facts 
introduced at trial relating to other charges, even ones of which the 
defendant has been acquitted.”78  Thus, continuing to act as if the 
sentencing revolution never happened (or at least as if the revolution had 
absolutely no significance to a constitutional inquiry about required 
sentencing procedures), the Watts Court held that it was permissible for the 
guidelines to mandate an increase in a defendant’s punishment based on 
“conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”79
Throughout the line of federal sentencing cases culminating in Watts, a 
few Justices noted that the transformation of sentencing under the 
guidelines raised questions about continued approval of the administrative 
procedures sanctioned in the context of the rehabilitation-oriented pre-
guidelines model of sentencing.80  But only Justice Stevens, by repeatedly 
assailing the application of pre-guidelines precedents to sustain the limited 
procedural rights afforded to defendants under the guidelines, engaged with 
the underlying conceptual realities of the sentencing revolution that 
produced the federal sentencing guidelines.  In his Watts dissent, Justice 
Stevens astutely noted that the “goals of rehabilitation and fairness served 
by individualized sentencing that formerly justified vesting judges with 
virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion have been replaced by the 
impersonal interest in uniformity and retribution.”81  He complained about 
the Court’s continued reliance on Williams since “its rationale depended 
largely on agreement with an individualized sentencing regime that is 
significantly different from the Guidelines system.”82  And Justice Stevens 
closed his Watts dissent by stressing “longstanding procedural requirements 
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence” and by asserting that the 
77 Id. at 151-52.
78 Id. at 152, 155.
79 Id. at 155.
80 See, e.g., id. at 170-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738, 754-63 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81 Watts, 519 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 165-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is 
repugnant to that jurisprudence.”83
B. AN OVERDUE, BUT STILL SURPRISING, NEW WORLD ORDER
A quarter-century after Judge Frankel’s call for sentencing reform, the 
sentencing revolution seemed to have achieved a measure of relative 
stability, if not conceptual soundness.  The sentencing reform movement 
had brought an enormous amount of substantive law to a field that Judge 
Frankel rightly accused of being “lawless,”84 but neither the Supreme 
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence nor the work of legislatures and 
sentencing commission seemed particularly concerned about updating the 
procedures through which this sentencing law was administered.  
Defendants in specific cases and commentators in the academic literature 
often contended that the philosophical basis and discretionary structure for 
lax sentencing procedures had been eliminated by modern sentencing 
reforms.  But the Supreme Court and other key sentencing actors and 
institutions seemed content to continue to rely upon an old world procedural 
model even for modern sentencing decision-making.
But then, all of a sudden, almost as if a mysterious fin-de-siecle
doctrinal light-switch was flipped, the Supreme Court’s sentencing 
jurisprudence took a remarkable turn and the Court started to express 
considerable concerns with traditionally lax sentencing procedures.  This 
new jurisprudence first surfaced with Almendarez-Torres v. United States85
and Jones v. United States,86 then shook the world of sentencing with the 
“watershed” Supreme Court ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey,87 and it has 
recently culminated with the “earthquake” decision in Blakely and the 
federal aftershock of Booker.88
In other recent articles, I have detailed some of the conceptual ins-and-
83 Id. at 169-70.
84 See sources cited supra note 13.
85 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
86 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
87 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing in dissent in Apprendi, is 
to be credited with using the term “watershed” to describe the majority’s decision.  See 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Apprendi decision 
“will surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law”).
88 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and others have invoked an earthquake metaphor to 
describe the impact of the Blakely decision.  See Senate, Judges Urge ‘Blakely’ Redux, 231 
N.Y.L.J. 2, 2 (2004) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s earthquake comments at the Ninth 
Circuit’s annual conference in July); see also Douglas A. Berman, The Blakely Earthquake 
and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 307 (2004).
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outs of this modern sentencing jurisprudence and suggested that this new 
jurisprudence can and should be viewed as the inevitable product of the 
pressures created by the intersection of the Supreme Court’s own revolution 
of criminal procedures and sentencing reformers’ revolution of the 
substance of sentencing decision-making.89  In short form, the essence of 
this story is that structured sentencing reforms—particularly because they 
have tended to make sentencing determinations more offense-oriented and 
fact-driven—have transformed sentencing decision-making into a more
trial-like enterprise.90  Because of this reality—combined particularly with 
the fact that, because of the large percentage of cases are resolved through 
guilty pleas, sentencing typically serves as the only trial-like procedure for 
most defendants91—it was likely only a matter of time before the Supreme 
Court imposed some form of restriction on how much of the day-to-day 
dynamics of criminal justice administration could be relegated to the largely 
procedure-free world of sentencing.92
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States93 and Jones v. United States,94 a 
significant and consequential number of Supreme Court Justices started to 
express serious concerns with judge-centered administrative sentencing 
procedures.  Though the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres ultimately 
concluded that evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions could be used to 
89 See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM  1
(forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing]; Douglas A. 
Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 9; Berman, supra
note 32.
90 See generally Beale, supra note 72; Herman, supra note 34; Hoffmann, supra note 62, 
at 267-68; Young, supra note 72.
91 See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of 
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1149-50 (2001) (stressing significance of prevalence of 
guilty pleas in the criminal justice system); see also United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 
259, 264-79 (D. Mass. 2004) (detailing the centrality of plea agreements and plea bargaining 
in the operation of the federal criminal justice system).
92 Professor Hoffmann made a similar observation in his article on Apprendi, in which he 
states:
Th[e] evolution in both the form and substance of sentencing hearings undoubtedly influenced 
the Court to see sentencing hearings as more like guilt/innocence trials than before [and] seems 
to be reflected in the Court’s abrupt change of direction in Apprendi.  In short, as an unintended 
consequence of the recent move from discretionary to determinate sentencing, sentencing 
hearings have begun to look more and more like adversarial proceedings, which in turn has 
helped to ensure that they will be treated, for constitutional purposes, more and more like 
adversarial proceedings.  Apprendi, in other words, is a natural and perhaps even predictable 
consequence of the recent trend toward adversarial-ness in sentencing.
Hoffmann, supra note 62, at 267-68.
93 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
94 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
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increase a sentence without being subject to the procedural rules for 
elements of crimes at trial, the 5-4 division of the Court, as well as Justice 
Scalia’s strong dissent asserting that the Court’s holding raised serious 
constitutional problems, was a harbinger of decisions to come.95  The 
following term, the Court in Jones suggested that Almendarez-Torres
announced a prior conviction exception to a rule that facts establishing 
higher penalties must be treated procedurally as offense elements.96
Then, in 2000, the same five Justices in the Jones majority voted in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey97 to convert the Jones Court’s suggestion into what 
Justice O’Connor in dissent called a “watershed” ruling.98  The Apprendi 
Court declared unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime enhancement that 
enabled a sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than the otherwise 
available statutory maximum for various crimes based on a finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an offense involved racial animus.  The 
Apprendi Court asserted the hate crime sentencing enhancement was 
constitutionally problematic because, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”99
Despite the constitutional rumblings in Almendarez-Torres and Jones, 
much of the criminal justice world was taken by surprise by the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Apprendi.  Given the constitutional discourse in 
Almendarez-Torres and Jones, however, it was not truly astonishing that a 
majority of Justices in Apprendi, perhaps impacted by cases litigated 
throughout the 1990s which highlighted the consequences of reliance on 
judge-centered administrative sentencing procedures after the sentencing 
revolution had turned sentencing decision-making into more of a trial-like 
enterprise, were troubled by provisions authorizing judges to greatly 
enhance criminal sentences based on preponderance fact-finding.  Still,
Apprendi was a shocking decision, in part because the Court’s holding and 
dicta, especially if construed broadly, could cast constitutional doubt on 
many sentencing statutes and guidelines enacted during the modern 
sentencing reform movement.  Most structured and guideline sentencing 
95 Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Almendarez-
Torres.  523 U.S. at 248 (Scalia, J, dissenting).
96 The Jones majority, which was comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas 
and Ginsburg, avoided an express constitutional holding by interpreting the statute at issue in 
Jones to comply with the suggested constitutional rule.  See 526 U.S. at 232-39.
97 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
98 See id. at 524 (O’Connor, J, dissenting) (asserting that the Apprendi decision “will 
surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law”).
99 Id. at 490.
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reforms provided a significant role for judicial fact-finding at sentencing, 
and the federal guidelines built such fact-finding into the foundation of its 
sentencing scheme.100 Apprendi’s holding and logic suggested that all 
modern sentencing decision-making which relied on judicial fact-finding, 
despite having been constitutionally blessed for decades, was now 
constitutionally problematic.
And yet, though Apprendi generated much litigation and many 
appellate decisions trying to interpret and give effect to its ruling,101 the 
decision initially proved to have a smaller impact on modern sentencing 
reforms than many expected or even hoped.  Lower federal and state courts 
typically interpreted Apprendi narrowly in order to preserve, as much as 
possible, existing sentencing structures that relied on judicial fact-
finding,102 and legislatures did not feel compelled to alter existing 
sentencing systems or criminal codes in light of Apprendi.103
The Supreme Court itself contributed significantly to restricting the 
reach of Apprendi through its decision in United States v. Harris.104  In 
Harris, the Court examined anew the issue it had previously addressed in 
McMillan, namely what procedures were constitutionally required when a 
statute specified a mandatory minimum sentencing term.  The Supreme 
Court in Harris ultimately reaffirmed McMillan and held, in a fractured 
ruling, that facts which mandated minimum penalties did not require 
submission to a jury or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.105  Though Harris 
100 See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 496 (1990) (describing the 
“relevant conduct” provisions, which call for judicial fact-finding of offense-related conduct, 
“the cornerstone of the federal sentencing guideline system”).
101 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 62, at 256 (noting that there were more than 400 
reported Apprendi decisions within a year of the decision); Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, 
Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000) (detailing some of the immediate 
post-Apprendi lower court litigation).
102 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as 
a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003).
103 The one exception to this story comes from Kansas, where the Kansas Supreme Court 
held after Apprendi that its judicially administered sentencing guidelines system was 
constitutionally problematic.  See State v. Cullen, 60 P.3d 933 (Kan. 2003); State v. Gould, 
23 P.3d 801, 814 (Kan. 2001).  The Kansas legislature responded by creating procedures for 
using sentencing juries to find necessary facts in certain cases. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4718 (Supp. 2A 2003).
104 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
105 Id.  On the same day Harris was decided, the Court also expanded Apprendi’s reach 
in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), by holding that facts that establish eligibility for the 
death penalty require submission to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, 
because most jurisdictions already relied on jury sentencing in capital cases, the Court’s 
decision in Harris to limit the procedural requirements for imposition of minimum sentences 
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is deemed by many to be conceptually hazy in light of Apprendi,106 the 
practical consequences of Harris appeared mighty clear at the time.  The 
holding in Harris suggested that, despite an Apprendi scare, the statutory 
and guidelines sentencing provisions developed during the sentencing 
revolution could largely continue to operate with judge-centered, 
administrative sentencing procedures.  As Professor Stephanos Bibas put 
matters at the time, by holding in Harris that only facts which raise 
maximum sentences, and not those which establish minimums, must be 
treated procedurally as elements, the Supreme Court seemed to have “caged 
the potentially ravenous, radical Apprendi tiger that threatened to devour 
modern sentencing law.”107
But then came the Blakely earthquake and the Booker aftershock.  
When certiorari was granted in Blakely v. Washington, most observers 
believed the case was to serve as final confirmation that the Apprendi
decision would not radically transform modern sentencing practices.  After 
Harris, the widely-shared belief was that the sentencing revolution had 
been spared from further constitutional intrusion, and it was thought that the 
Supreme Court would use Blakely to rule, as had nearly all lower courts, 
that Apprendi had no applicability to judicial fact-finding which only 
impacted guideline sentencing outcomes within otherwise applicable 
statutory ranges.
But Justice Scalia, writing for the Court and on behalf of the same 
group of five Justices constituting the majority in Jones and Apprendi, 
concluded that Ralph Blakely’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was 
violated when a Washington State sentencing judge enhanced his guideline 
sentence based on the judge’s factual finding that his kidnapping offense 
involved “deliberate cruelty.”108  Linking this holding back to the Court’s 
Apprendi ruling, Justice Scalia explained:
Our precedents make clear . . . that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in 
seemed at the time to be the most important and telling iteration of the scope and reach of 
Apprendi.
106 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional 
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33 (2003); Kyron Huigens, 
Harris, Ring, and the Future of Relevant Conduct Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP.  88 
(2002); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“I cannot easily distinguish Apprendi . . . from this case in terms of logic.  For 
that reason, I cannot agree with the plurality’s opinion insofar as it finds such a 
distinction.”).
107 Stephanos Bibas, Back from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending 
Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 79, 79 (2002).
108 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2531.
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the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  In other words, the relevant “statutory 
maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional 
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.109
Justice Scalia further explained that this particular articulation of the 
meaning and reach of Apprendi “reflects not just respect for longstanding 
precedent, but the need to give intelligible content to the right of a jury trial.  
That right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of 
power in our constitutional structure.”110  And Justice Scalia concluded his 
opinion for the Court with the breathtakingly bold assertion that “every 
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts 
legally essential to the punishment.”111
The potential impact of Blakely on modern sentencing systems is truly 
staggering because the decision not only redefined the reach of Apprendi,
but also suggests that any and every fact “legally essential to the 
punishment” must be either proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or 
admitted by the defendant.  Indeed, it is hard to read the opinion without 
believing that the Blakely majority had conclusively decided that the 
sentencing revolution, which had come to rely on judge-centered 
administrative sentencing procedures, should have to start granting 
defendants the full panoply of jury-centered adversarial procedures.  
Consequently, after the Supreme Court agreed to consider on an expedited 
schedule Blakely’s applicability to the federal sentencing guidelines in the 
cases of United States v. Booker112 and United States v. Fanfan,113 nearly all 
observers were prepared for the Court to declare Blakely applicable to the 
federal system and thereby find unconstitutional the federal sentencing 
guidelines’ reliance on judicial fact-finding at sentencing.
And yet, the Supreme Court in Booker still found a way to surprise and 
confound legal observers by devising an unexpected remedy for the federal 
system.  The same five Justices who comprised the majorities in Jones, 
Apprendi, and Blakely did rule in Booker that the federal sentencing 
guidelines, when instructing judges to make factual findings to calculate
increases in applicable sentencing ranges, transgressed the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial right.114  But the prescribed remedy in Booker was 
109 Id. at 2537.
110 Id. at 2538-39.
111 Id. at 2543.
112 See 125 S. Ct. 11 (2005) (granting certiorari in Booker and providing for expedited 
briefing schedule).
113 See 125 S. Ct. 12 (2005) (granting certiorari in Fanfan and providing for expedited 
briefing schedule).
114 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
676 DOUGLAS A. BERMAN [Vol. 95
not, as this ruling would seem to connote, a larger role for juries in the 
operation of the federal sentencing system.  Rather, as a result of a 
defection by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a different group of five Justices, 
the Apprendi and Blakely dissenters plus Justice Ginsburg, concluded that 
the remedy for this Sixth Amendment problem was to declare the federal 
sentencing guidelines wholly advisory.115
The Booker decision, remarkable for many reasons, found a way to 
make a conceptually muddled constitutional jurisprudence concerning 
sentencing procedures even more opaque.  Through the dual rulings of 
dueling majorities, the Supreme Court in Booker declared that the federal 
sentencing system could no longer rely upon mandated and tightly directed 
judicial fact-finding, and as a remedy it created a system which now 
depends upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-finding.  Thus, 
to culminate a jurisprudence seemingly seeking to vindicate the role of the 
jury and to require a new set of sentencing procedures in modern sentencing 
systems, the so-called “remedial majority” in Booker devised a new system 
of federal sentencing which granted judges more sentencing power than 
they had ever previously wielded and seemingly endorsed the entire 
panoply of relatively lax sentencing procedures that had been used in the 
federal system over the prior two decades.
C.  THE LURKING DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE NEW SENTENCING 
JURISPRUDENCE
Though the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence can and 
will be examined and critiqued from many angles and perspectives, my 
chief goal in this Foreword is to spotlight the critical procedural issues that 
lurk in the jurisprudential penumbras of the discussion of the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial right in Blakely and Booker.  Blakely and Booker 
have been cast by the Supreme Court, and analyzed by commentators, as 
almost exclusively about jury trial rights and the decision-making authority 
of judges and juries.  But it is critical to recognize and appreciate that the 
Supreme Court’s reoriented sentencing jurisprudence has roots in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice 
provision of the Sixth Amendment.
In the often overlooked case of Jones v. United States—which 
presaged Apprendi and set out the key principle that Apprendi announced 
and Blakely developed as a new constitutional mandate—the Supreme 
Court drew on constitutional provisions and principles beyond the Sixth 
115 See id. at 756-71 (Breyer J., announcing opinion of the Court, with Rehnquist, C.J. & 
O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
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Amendment’s jury trial right.  Decided in 1999, the year before Apprendi, 
Jones was the first case in which five Justices expressly suggested that facts 
establishing higher penalties must be treated procedurally as offense 
elements,116 and the Jones Court stated the basis and reach of its developing 
constitutional rule in broad terms.  In a key footnote, the Jones Court 
asserted that “a set of constitutional concerns that have emerged through a 
series of our decisions over the past quarter century” suggested the principle 
that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice 
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior 
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be 
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”117  Notably, in his opinion for the Court in Booker, 
Justice Stevens explains and emphasizes Jones as the first case in which the 
Supreme Court, responding to the “new trend in the legislative regulation of 
sentencing,” started to revise its constitutional jurisprudence of required 
sentencing procedures.118
Further, in building upon Jones to establish a definitive constitutional 
rule in Apprendi, the Supreme Court expressly drew upon the due process 
concepts which the Court in Winship had used to formalize “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof in criminal prosecutions.  The 
Apprendi Court explained that since Winship, “we have made clear beyond 
peradventure that Winship’s due process and associated jury protections 
extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s 
guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’”119  And 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Booker starts its substantive 
discussion with a quote from Winship’s due process ruling about standards 
of proof, and states that these principles, “firmly rooted in the common law, 
have provided the basis for recent decisions interpreting modern criminal 
statutes and sentencing procedures.”120
In other words, before Blakely and Booker recast the Supreme Court’s 
reoriented sentencing jurisprudence toward just the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial right, it was clear that the “watershed” rule suggested in Jones and 
established in Apprendi was about a lot more—particularly, what the Due 
116 The Jones majority, which was comprised of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas 
and Ginsburg, avoided an express constitutional holding by interpreting the statute at issue in 
Jones to comply with the suggested constitutional rule.  See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 
227, 232-39 (1999).
117 Id. at 243 n.6.
118 See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748-49, 771-52, 756 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the 
Court).
119 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 484 (2000) (citation omitted).
120 See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747-48 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the Court).
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Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the notice 
provision of the Sixth Amendment might mean for modern sentencing 
systems.  The broader constitutional ambit of Jones and Apprendi was for 
good reason.  As highlighted in Part I of this Foreword, the rehabilitative 
philosophy of punishment provided the conceptual justification in Williams 
v. New York  for not extending constitutionally protected trial rights to 
sentencing.121  Because the medical model of sentencing which dominated 
before modern reforms conceived sentencing as an enterprise designed to 
help “cure” the sick defendant, the idea of significant procedural rights at 
sentencing almost did not make sense:  Just as patients are not thought to 
need “procedural rights” when being treated by a doctor, defendants were 
not thought to need procedural rights when being sentenced by a court.  But 
it has now been nearly a quarter century since the rehabilitative model of 
sentencing has held sway, and yet until Jones and Apprendi and Blakely and 
Booker came along, our sentencing structures still relied without much 
question on lax procedures for proving the truth of facts that would lead to 
extended sentences.
In short, because the fundamental philosophy and essential goals of 
modern sentencing have been reconceived, a broad jurisprudential 
rethinking of the structures and procedures for modern sentencing decision-
making has in fact been long overdue.  Though Blakely and Booker have 
spotlighted the jury trial right, the due process and notice issues raised by 
the Supreme Court in Jones and Apprendi should be an integral part of new 
jurisprudential debates over modern sentencing procedures.  Indeed, in our 
real world of guilty pleas in which jury trial rights are waived in nine out of 
every ten cases, the future development of the due process and notice issues 
lurking around the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence are 
likely more important to the parties and likely to have a greater practical 
impact than further development of the jury trial right.122
But though Jones and Apprendi expressly, and Blakely and Booker 
implicitly, draw upon constitutional due process and notice principles and 
provisions, none of these decisions have charted a clear course for a 
reconceived constitutional jurisprudence of sentencing procedures.  Indeed, 
though these rulings appear tortured and opaque concerning the meaning 
and application of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right, they have 
actually produced an even greater conceptual and doctrinal muddle 
121 See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
122 See Bibas, supra note 91, at 1177-78 (discussing importance to sentencing 
determinations of procedural issues other than the jury trial right); Bowman, supra note 32, 
at 187-91 (same); see also James E. Felman, The Need for Procedural Reform in Federal 
Criminal Cases , 17 FED. SENTENCING REP. ___ (forthcoming 2005).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art14
2005] MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS 679
concerning other procedural rights of defendants at sentencing.  
Consequently, in this Foreword I do not—really cannot—aspire to provide 
a complete account of all the issues and concerns of sentencing procedure 
that deserve and demand attention in the wake of Blakely and Booker.  But I 
can and will in Part III briefly sketch some considerations for courts and 
other key sentencing actors and institutions as they explore what process is 
due in modern sentencing systems.
III. PONDERING A MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS
Looking forward to conclude this Foreword, in this final Part my goal 
is to suggest that the doctrinal particulars and uncertainties of Blakely and 
Booker should not eclipse the broader procedural messages and lessons to 
be drawn from the Supreme Court’s new sentencing jurisprudence.  
Whatever else one thinks about Blakely and Booker, these cases deserve
credit for engendering a national conversation on a range of sentencing 
issues, and they should particularly encourage jurisdictions to examine and 
reflect broadly upon the appropriate structure and procedures of modern 
sentencing decision-making.  In addition, as jurisdictions review and 
respond to the rulings in Blakely and Booker, policymakers have a unique 
opportunity to consider which institutions ought to take the lead in 
examining and establishing the appropriate structure and procedures of 
modern sentencing decision-making.
A. CRITICAL ISSUES, AND UNCERTAIN PRINCIPLES, FOR MODERN 
SENTENCING PROCEDURE
Because Blakely and Booker focus particularly on the division of 
decision-making authority between juries and judges, it is dangerously easy 
to view these cases as only about the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right.  
Indeed, because much of the post-Booker discussion of federal sentencing 
law and policy has focused upon the pros and cons of judicial sentencing 
discretion and the relative severity of federal sentences, it is dangerously 
easy to forget that Blakely and Booker are fundamentally cases about 
sentencing procedures in the first instance.
But, as suggested in the exegesis of the Supreme Court’s old and new 
sentencing jurisprudence of Part II, the constitutional regulation of 
sentencing procedures in general, and the recent decisions in Jones and 
Apprendi and Blakely and Booker in particular, implicate other 
constitutional provisions and principles.  Indeed, all of the Supreme Court’s 
sentencing cases and the reactions they have engendered—especially when 
viewed against the backdrop of the historical development of sentencing 
laws and procedures detailed in the first two Parts of this Foreword—
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highlight the inextricable link between the substance and procedures of 
modern sentencing reforms.  Judge Frankel’s concerns about “The Dubious 
Process” at sentencing, which he expressed more than three decades ago in 
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, highlighted at the very beginning 
of the modern sentencing reform era that effective procedural reforms are a 
critical and necessary part of any effort to achieve the substantive goals of 
sentencing reform.123  And, throughout three decades of modern sentencing 
reforms, numerous judges and academic commentators have lamented the
insufficient attention given to fundamental procedural issues—such as 
notice to parties, burdens of proof, appropriate fact-finders, evidentiary 
rules and hearing processes—that play a central role in the actual 
application of general sentencing rules to specific cases.124  Moreover, in 
the wake of Blakely and Booker, an array of sentencing participants are 
starting to explore more fully the importance of effective and appropriate 
sentencing procedures to the broader goals of sentencing reform.125
Though Blakely and Booker have now ensured that the jury trial right 
of the Sixth Amendment receives attention and consideration, that right 
only concerns who makes certain determinations, not how these 
determinations are made.  But, as stressed in the final section of Part II, the 
“watershed” rule suggested in Jones and established in Apprendi also 
concerns the procedural matters such as notice to parties and burdens of 
proof.  Though Blakely and Booker spelled out what the Jones/Apprendi
rule means for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right in 
modern sentencing schemes, additional decisions will be needed for a full 
articulation of what the Jones/Apprendi rule means for notice and proof 
issues in modern sentencing schemes.
Moreover, sentencing decision-making encompasses or implicates 
many more procedural issues and many more constitutional provisions than 
123 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
124 See sources cited supra note 72; see also Gertner, supra note 7, at 83-85; STITH & 
CABRANES, supra note 5, at 148-158; Bibas, supra note 91, at 1177-78.  See generally
Richard Smith-Monahan, Unfinished Business: The Changes Necessary to Make Guidelines 
Sentencing Fair, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 219 (2000).
125 See, e.g., Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray, Testimony to the House 
Subcommittee of Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security: Oversight Hearing on “The 
Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines” at 11 
(Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Wray021005.pdf 
(stressing that “to have consistent sentences, it is essential that sentencing hearings have 
consistent form and substance”); Felman, supra note 122; see also United States v. Kelley, 
355 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034-39 (D. Neb. 2005) (discussing role and importance of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt even within an advisory guideline system); United States v. Gray, 
2005 WL 613645, at **4-8 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 17, 2005) (same); United States v. Pimental, 
2005 WL _____, at __ (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2005).
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most courts and commentators realize.  Indeed, in a recent article, Professor 
Alan Michaels has identified twenty-five significant procedural rights that 
defendants have at a criminal trial—“from employing an attorney to not 
having inferences drawn from one’s silence, from bail and Brady to 
presence and proceeding pro se”—which could plausibly be extended to 
sentencing.126  Interestingly, in his comprehensive (pre-Blakely) taxonomy 
of sentencing rights, Professor Michaels has determined that the Supreme 
Court “has found roughly one quarter [of these twenty-five trial rights] 
apply at sentencing and one quarter do not” and that the rights “in the 
remaining half, still undecided at the Supreme Court level, have been 
resolved with similar percentages by lower courts—some apply, some do 
not, and about half remain unresolved.”127  Though the doctrinal particulars 
and broader significance of each of these rights is beyond the scope of this 
Foreword, Professor Michaels’ analysis spotlights how much 
jurisprudential work lies ahead as the Supreme Court and lower courts 
continue to confront procedural issues that necessarily arise due to the ever 
more trial-like realities of modern sentencing decision-making within 
structured and guideline sentencing systems.128
But the key challenge for courts—and, as explained below, for other 
sentencing institutions and policy-makers—is not the sheer number of 
procedural issues, but rather the principles which should be brought to bear 
in deciding whether and how constitutional trial rights ought to be 
recognized and safeguarded at sentencing.  Though lacking a fundamental 
legal structure and often leading to disparate outcomes, the rehabilitative 
model of sentencing at least had the virtue of providing an underlying 
theory for determining whether and how trial rights ought to be recognized 
at sentencing.  In service to the rehabilitative ideal, sentencing judges and 
parole officials, purportedly endowed with unique insights and expertise in
deciding what sorts and lengths of punishments were necessary to best 
serve each criminal offender’s rehabilitative potential, needed complete 
information about offenses and offenders in order to craft effective 
rehabilitative sentences.  As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. 
New York129 and in other constitutional rulings of the period,130 the 
126 See Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1775 (2003).
127 Id.
128 See generally supra text accompanying notes 83-91 (discussing the Apprendi lines of 
cases as the by-product of structured sentencing reforms having transformed sentencing 
decision-making into a more trial-like enterprise).
129 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-48 (1949); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 44-51.
130 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 
(1979); United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-54 (1978).
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rehabilitative ideal called for sentencing judges and parole officials to be 
freed from any procedural rules which might work to limit the sound 
exercise of their discretion. The historical commitment to the rehabilitative 
ideal and the Supreme Court’s long-standing adherence to Williams (even 
as the rehabilitative ideal was largely rejected by modern sentencing 
reforms131) perhaps accounts for how Professor Michaels was able to find 
“a consistent principle” in his (pre-Blakely) examination of the Supreme 
Court’s sentencing jurisprudence.  According to Professor Michaels, the 
Supreme Court’s approach to sentencing procedures has historically sought 
to vindicate what he calls “the best-estimate principle” by facilitating 
judicial efforts to craft a “proper” sentence:
The Court’s decisions are consistent with a conception of sentencing as 
constitutionally mandating a balanced and thorough effort to determine the “right” 
sentence, within the range of prescribed penalties.  In making that determination, 
however, there is no mandated presumption of “sentencing innocence”—in other 
words, no requirement that the defendant be given the benefit of the doubt.  Within 
the range of allowable sentences, “too low” is not intrinsically better than “too high.”  
The mandate is to make a best estimate of the “right” sentence, but without the built-
in presumption towards resolving errors in the defendant’s favor that is present at the 
trial level.132
Given that the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence historically 
was influenced and shaped by the rehabilitative ideal and its commitment to 
“curing” offenders—which, explained the Williams Court, meant many 
offenders “could be less severely punished and restored sooner to complete 
freedom and useful citizenship”133—it likely once was in everyone’s 
interest to keep procedural rights from getting in the way of determining the 
“best” sentence.  Because the rehabilitative ideal necessarily incorporated 
pro-defendant values, it made sense for this Supreme Court’s sentencing 
jurisprudence to foster “a balanced and thorough process [by recognizing] 
rights that support accuracy concerns or that tend to put the prosecution and 
defense on a more even playing field,” but to not recognize rights “that 
offer the defendant special protections such as those that automatically 
resolve errors in the defendant’s favor or primarily protect the defendant’s 
autonomy.”134
But, as suggested earlier, an express or implicit component of most 
statutory and guideline sentencing reforms has been a rejection of the 
rehabilitative ideal.135  The sentencing revolution has ushered in punitive 
131 See supra text accompanying notes 9-31, 58-61.
132 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 1775-76.
133 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
134 See Michaels, supra note 126, at 1862.
135 Recall the Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act at issue in McMillan
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sentencing provisions as jurisdictions have directly or indirectly repudiated 
or reformed many tenets of the old rehabilitative sentencing concept.  But 
the sentencing revolution has rejected the old conceptual and procedural 
sentencing model without providing a clear and philosophically cogent new 
conceptual or procedural model to take its place.136
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s dual rulings in Booker can be 
viewed and understood as reflecting two divergent conceptual and 
procedural models competing for a new dominance in the wake of the 
demise of the rehabilitative ideal.  The (partial) opinion of Justice Stevens 
for the Court in Booker discusses the impact of modern sentencing reforms 
on the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in a way that champions 
providing defendants with special procedural protections at sentencing.137
Discussing the “new trend in the legislative regulation of sentencing,” 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court in Booker highlights that the “effect 
of the increasing emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges . . . was 
to increase the judge’s power and diminish that of the jury.”138
Consequently, explains Justice Stevens, the new sentencing laws required, 
for the sake of “preserving an ancient guarantee under a new set of 
circumstances,”139 a new constitutional jurisprudence:
The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address the question how the right of 
jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury would 
still stand between the individual and the power of the government under the new 
sentencing regime.  And it is the new circumstances, not a tradition or practice that the 
new circumstances have superseded, that have led us to the answer first considered in 
Jones and developed in Apprendi and subsequent cases culminating with this one. It is 
an answer not motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism but by the need to preserve 
Sixth Amendment substance.140
This passage reveals that Justice Stevens is seeking to lead a faction of the 
which sought, in the words of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “to protect the public 
from armed criminals and to deter violent crime and the illegal use of firearms generally, as 
well as to vindicate its interest in punishing those who commit serious crimes with guns.”
Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985).
136 I explore more fully the conceptual vacuum created by the decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal and suggest ways to fill this vacuum in another recent article.  See
Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, supra note 89.
137 Of course, as evidenced by his dissents in McMillan and Watts, see supra text 
accompanying notes 67-69, 80-82, Justice Stevens has been advocating a revised approach to 
the constitutional regulation of sentencing procedures since the outset of the modern 
sentencing reform era.
138 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 751 (Stevens, J., announcing opinion of the Court, with Scalia, 
Souter, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
139 Id. at 752.
140 Id.
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Supreme Court toward a new jurisprudence that will provide greater 
procedural protections to individual defendants in the application of modern 
statutory and guidelines sentencing systems.
But, of course, Justice Stevens’s (partial) opinion for the Court in 
Booker is only half the story since, as a result of a defection by Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Breyer’s (partial) opinion for the Court established the 
remedy in Booker.  The remedy crafted for the Court by Justice Breyer, 
which evades Sixth Amendment problems by making the federal sentencing 
guidelines advisory instead of mandatory, essentially endorses the relatively 
lax sentencing procedures that have been used in the federal system over the 
prior two decades.  Justice Breyer makes clear throughout his opinion that 
he does not share Justice Stevens’s concern with providing individual 
defendants with special protections at sentencing.  Rather, Justice Breyer 
represents a faction of the Supreme Court embracing whatever sentencing 
procedures are needed to foster the modern sentencing reform goal of 
achieving greater sentencing uniformity.141  Justice Breyer’s opinion for the 
Court in Booker assails the proposed remedy of “engrafting” jury trial rights 
onto the federal sentencing system because doing so would undermine the 
goals of sentencing uniformity.142  In other words, Justice Breyer thinks 
sentencing procedures should still serve, in Professor Michaels’s 
terminology, the “the best-estimate principle,”143 although now the goal is 
to achieve more uniform sentences rather than rehabilitative sentences.
In short, the pitched battle over the rights and results in Blakely and 
Booker reflect competing visions of what procedural concepts and norms 
will take center-stage as the Supreme Court considers the applicable 
constitutional rules for modern sentencing decision-making.  Justice 
Stevens leads a faction of the Court concerned about safeguarding 
procedural rights for defendants at sentencing, while Justice Breyer leads a 
faction of the Court concerned about ensuring that applicable procedures at 
sentencing serve the goal of sentencing uniformity.  But, with Justice 
Ginsburg having allied herself with both of these competing factions in 
Booker, the schizophrenic Booker ruling further obscures which principles
should guide lower courts in considering the broad range of procedural 
issues beyond jury trial rights that follow in the wake of Booker.  Yet the 
141 See id. at 756-71 (Breyer, J., announcing opinion of the Court with Rehnquist, C.J., & 
O’Connor, Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., joining).
142 See id. at 761 (arguing the “real conduct/uniformity-in-sentencing relationship” would 
not be served by having juries involved in sentencing guideline determinations); id. at 762-
63 (contending that, due to the impact of plea bargaining, application of jury trial rights in 
the federal guidelines system would undermine efforts to achieve greater sentencing 
uniformity).
143 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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fate and future of sentencing procedures—particularly concerning critical 
issues such as notice to parties and burdens of proofs—may depend greatly 
on the outcome of this conceptual battle.  Consider, as but one possible 
example, the issue of burden of proof:  A heightened concern for 
defendants’ procedural rights at sentencing suggests a heightened burden of 
proof for facts which lead to longer sentences, but a concern for sentencing 
uniformity might support continued application of the preponderance 
standard of proof.
B. A ROLE FOR OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Seeking to find a silver lining in the conceptual dark cloud that is the 
Booker decision, we might laud the case for at least helping to define the 
terms of debate as courts ponder a new process for modern sentencing.  
Moreover, the agonizing jurisprudential struggles reflected in Apprendi, 
Harris, Blakely and Booker reveal that courts may not always be the ideal 
institution for the development of modern sentencing procedures and that 
other institutions need to play an integral role in the consideration of the 
critical procedural issues that surround modern sentencing reforms.
Indeed, the modern history of sentencing reforms set out in this 
Foreword suggests there are harmonic cycles in the way legislatures and 
courts develop sentencing laws and procedures.  For more than fifty years 
there has been an on-going inter-branch dialogue about sentencing laws and 
practices,144 although the discussion of sentencing procedures has been 
woefully underdeveloped and problematically stagnant.  Indeed, the recent 
tortured development of the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence may 
in part reflect the failure of other institutions to help work through the 
procedural issues raised by the modern sentencing revolution.  Moreover, 
looking beyond the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential struggles, it should be 
clear that the conceptual reconsideration of sentencing law and procedure in 
light of the sentencing revolution is not a job just for courts; the legal 
developments and principles spotlighted by Jones and Apprendi and Blakely
and Booker should be understood by legislatures and sentencing 
commissions as an invitation to reexamine a broad range of issues of 
sentencing procedure and practice.145 The work of legislatures, sentencing 
commissions, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers and parole 
boards can and should be informed by attentiveness to all the substantive 
and procedural provisions and principles spotlighted by Jones and Apprendi
144 Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550-51 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the inter-branch dialogue concerning modern sentencing reforms).
145 See generally Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, supra note 89 (suggesting 
some principles for the broad conceptual reconsideration of sentencing law and policy).
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and Blakely and Booker.
Reflecting broadly on the sentencing reform era, we should seize this 
moment in the evolution of modern sentencing reforms to return to the 
fundamental concepts and sound suggestions of Judge Marvin Frankel and 
particularly to recall his advocacy of expert sentencing commissions as a 
central player in reforming sentencing law and procedures.  The sentencing 
commission as an institution grew out of the realization that neither the 
judiciary nor legislatures had been able to, nor could really be expected to, 
develop and monitor effective and comprehensive sentencing reforms.146
Sentencing commissions were envisoned, and have been designed, to have 
the resources and expertise to engineer systemic sentencing reforms.147
Moreover, as an administrative body able not only to study the workings of 
the criminal justice system as a whole, but also to implement, monitor and 
adjust multi-faceted system-wide reforms, sentencing commissions are 
uniquely positioned to assess the complex procedural issues that impact the 
workings of the criminal justice system.148
Of course, because of the general neglect of procedural matters in prior 
reform efforts, sentencing commission have a lot of work to do: critical 
procedural issues like notice to parties, appropriate fact-finders, burdens of 
proof, applicable evidentiary rules, and sound hearing procedures are all in 
need of careful and extended study and call for thoughtful reforms, 
particularly since the move toward structured sentencing systems have 
tended to transform sentencing decision-making into a more trial-like 
enterprise.  But it is not foolhardy to find optimism in the possible efforts of 
sentencing commissions given the generally positive track-record of these 
146 See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Need and Opportunity for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 95-96 (1999); 
see also Michael H. Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 315 (1978) (discussing various justifications for, and benefits of, the creation of a 
sentencing commission); von Hirsch, supra note 5 (same).
147 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) 
(examining the history behind, and efficacies of, the development of sentencing 
commissions); Michael Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel’s Sentencing Commission, 64 
U. COLO. L. REV. 713, 714-16 (1993) (same); cf. Berman, supra note 143, at 108-10 (noting 
some of the institutional struggles of the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
148 See Barry L. Johnson, The Role of the United States Sentencing Commission in the 
Reform of Sentencing Procedures, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 229, 230-31 (2000) 
(highlighting features of the U.S. Sentencing Commission that make it an appropriate body 
for procedural reforms in the federal sentencing system); cf. Ronald F. Wright, Rules for 
Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1380-87 (1999) (stressing the importance of a 
coordinated approach to sentencing and highlighting the inability of judges to effectively 
coordinate sentencing reforms).
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art14
2005] MODERN SENTENCING PROCESS 687
institutions in the development of substantive sentencing reforms.149
Though, as stressed in Part I, the efforts of sentencing commissions have 
heretofore been directed primarily at substantive sentencing law, there is 
reason to hope that Jones and Apprendi, and now Blakely and Booker, will 
prompt commissions to carry forward their reform efforts to address the 
specifics of sentencing procedures.  Moreover, there is a basis for believing 
that sentencing commissions are well-designed and well-positioned to 
explore and reach compromises concerning competing conceptual visions 
of modern sentencing procedures.  There may prove to be considerable 
common ground shared by the seemingly divergent visions of modern 
sentencing procedures reflected in the opinions of Justice Stevens and 
Justice Breyer in Booker, and sentencing commissions developing new 
sentencing procedures proactively may be better able to find that common 
ground than can courts responding reactively to specific procedural claims 
being pressed in particular cases by individual defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Blakely and Booker do not, and even future constitutional rulings may 
not, directly force legislatures, sentencing commissions, lower courts and 
other sentencing actors and institutions to revisit and revise all (or even 
many) of the procedures that attend existing sentencing schemes.  In other 
words, these decisions do not directly mandate that all those in the 
sentencing field move beyond Blakely and Booker to ponder modern 
sentencing process.  The hope for more effective sentencing reforms may 
thus turn on whether the Blakely and Booker decisions have positive 
reverberations for the work of sentencing lawmakers, and in particular 
sentencing commissions, even beyond their constitutional impact.  Even 
without any further Supreme Court guidance, legislatures, sentencing 
commissions, lower courts and other sentencing actors and institutions 
should appreciate and respond to the simple, fundamental policy message 
that Jones, Apprendi, Blakely and Booker all radiate:  Procedures really 
149 Calling commission-centered sentencing reform in the states a success would not 
engender much debate.  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 144, at 771-98 (discussing the success 
of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines in the states); Tonry, supra note 144, 
at 713-16 (same).  Though federal sentencing reforms driven by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission have been subject to more criticism than praise, see, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, 
Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 42-43 (2000) (detailing widespread 
criticisms of the federal sentencing system), even the U.S. Sentencing Commission can be 
expected to serve as an effective catalyst for future federal reform if it can learn from its past 
challenges.  See Barkow, supra note 144, at 798-812 (suggesting means for sentencing 
commissions to be more effective).
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matter at sentencing.
Read together, the Court’s work in those four cases, though divisive 
and conceptually underdeveloped, provides a wonderful primer on the 
significance and the centrality of procedural issues in the actual operation of 
a sentencing system.  And the burgeoning academic commentary in the 
wake of these decisions only reinforces and amplifies this critical message.  
The Jones and Apprendi and Blakely and Booker decisions, as well as the 
renewed debate over sentencing policies, practices and procedures that they 
have helped engender, can and should effectively inform a long-overdue 
policy dialogue among legislatures, sentencing commissions and courts 
concerning procedural matters that have heretofore been incompletely 
contemplated in the modern sentencing reform movement.  All of these 
decisions will truly mark a “watershed” development if they not only bring 
needed light to critical procedural issues raised in modern sentencing 
schemes, but also manage to prod sound procedural reforms that go beyond 
whatever constitutional minimums are ultimately established by the 
Supreme Court.
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